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In this paper several infinite two-person games are studied, all
having the following common structure: Player 1 (Emitter) produces a
binary periodic sequence. Player 2 (Predictor) observes some initial
segment of this sequence and then tries to predict the next digit. The
payoff to Emitter is zero if the prediction is a correct one. The games
differ in additional assumptions—those are in particular: (1) Pre-
dictor required to make his prediction after observing a prescribed
number of digits of the sequence. (2) Predictor allowed to observe
any number of digits but earning a decreasing amount for each correct
prediction as the number increases. (3) The period of the emitted
sequence being chosen by random from some fixed distribution. (4)
Emitter allowed to choose the period but being paid a decreasing
amount for incorrect prediction as the period increases. Combining
these assumptions two zero-sum and two nonzero-sum games are obtained.
It is shown that all these games possess a solution, some are at least
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In this paper we study certain types of infinite games which
belong to the class of discrete emission-prediction games, also
known as discrete games of aiming and evasion. An emission-pre-
diction game is a two-person game, where the first player, to be
named Emitter, produces a sequence of elements from some fixed
finite set A. The second player, to be named Predictor, is allowed
to observe the sequence for some time and is then required to make
a prediction of some kind about the future behavior of the sequence.
The general Predictor's goal is to make a correct prediction, while
Emitter wants to avoid this.
Emission-prediction games may serve as models for a variety
of conflict situations. For instance, Emitter could be identified
as an attacker (bomber, submarine, guided missile, guerilla
unit) performing a series of evasive maneuvers, which, in the dis-
crete time, represent the sequence being emitted. Predictor is
trying to destroy the attacker. Since, in general, the attacker
can be intercepted only after one or more time units have elapsed
from the last observed maneuver (or position) , Predictor must be
able to correctly predict future maneuvers (positions) of the
attacker.
To our best knowledge the study of emission-prediction games
was initiated by Isaacs (the "bomber and battleship" problem
and have since been investigated by Dubins [2], Isaacs and Karlin [5],
Isaacs [4], Karlin [6], Blackwell [1], Ferguson [3] and Matula [7],
The assumptions made by these authors can be summarized as follows
(1) No restriction is placed upon the emitted sequence.
(2) Predictor is allowed to observe the sequence as long as he
wishes before he decides to make a prediction concerning
several subsequent terms of the sequence.
(3) The game is a zero-sum game with the payoff depending only
on the discrepancy between the prediction and the actual
values
.
The emission-prediction games investigated in this paper
differ mainly in one crucial aspect; we assume that the emitted
sequence is a periodic one. Apart from this being of interest per
se we have been motivated by the following idea. Suppose that the
attacker is a simple automatic device with built-in preprogrammed
ability to perform evasive maneuvers. The trajectory of this
device will then follow a periodic pattern with some period depend-
ing upon the complexity of the program and unknown to Predictor
—
the defender. Even in situations where the attacker is controlled
by a human operator periodicity may very well serve as a first
approximation. We believe that most humans do exhibit a kind of
cyclic pattern when asked to perform a series of evasive, i.e.
unpredictable maneuvers.
Assuming periodicity of the emitted sequence, however,
compels us to place some additional restrictions on Emitter and/or
Predictor since otherwise the game would not possess a solution.
The additional restrictions considered in this paper are: the
period is chosen by an independent chance mechanism, bounds on the
length of observation intervals, and penalties for long periods and
lengthy observation. As for the type of prediction required we
limited outselves to the simplest case of predicting the next term
of the sequence. (With the periodicity assumptions this is by no
means trivial as it would be without it.) For the sake of simpli-
city of notation we consider binary sequences only; most of the
results of this paper extend easily to the m-ary case.
Another possible application of the model may be that of
an optimum jamming strategy for a missile defense system. Suppose
that a ship is being attacked by a missile equipped with a target
search radar. To avoid detection the search radar is not active
all the time but rather is constantly being switched on and off in
some programmed pattern. The intensity of illumination of the tar-
get by the search radar then follows a binary periodic sequence
(in a discrete time). The defender of the target (ship) wants to
jam the search radar. The jamming device, however, must not be
transmitting all the time since the missile could then home on the
transmitter and hence the target. Thus, the defender faces the
problem of predicting the next mode of operation of the search
radar after observing the illumination pattern for some limited
time, i.e., predicting next term of the binary sequence.
2. PRELIMINARIES.
Throughout this paper the symbol A will denote the two-
element set A = {0,1} and the symbol Q with generic elements
U) will denote the set of all periodic sequences of zeros and ones
We say that a binary sequence
a) = ((D^w-, . ..) J w
n
€
A; n = 1,2,...;




f°r every n = 1,2,...; k - 1,2,... .




fl : tt(u) = t}
so that fl is a disjoint union of fl..,fi~,... .
If to £ fl and n = 1,2,... then to will denote the
n
n-th term and w| the ordered n-tuple of the first n terms
of the sequence u).
Let A be the set of all ordered n-tuples of zeros and
ones. If a = (a, , . . . ,a ) £ A and 3 € A then ag is the
1 n
00
ordered (n+1) -tuple (a , . .
.
,a
, £) and (a) is the periodic
sequence
w = (a n ,...,a ,a.,...,a ,...). Clearly, Tr((a) ) £ n.1 n 1 n
For every a 6 A and t = 1,2,... we define the function
00
{1





X(a) = min{t = 1,2,... : I (a) = 1}. (2)
Thus I (a) serves as an indicator of "potential periods" of a
and A (a) is the "smallest potential period" of a.
Later we will need the following lemma,
Lemma 2.1 ; For every a 6 A there exists a £ A such that
A (act) >
number x.
+ 1, where [x] denotes the integral part of the






T(a) = {t = l,...,n-l : I (a) = 1} if n > 1
and T(a) = if n = 1. Notice first that
T(aO) fl T(al) =
and (3)
T(aO) U T(al) = T(a) U {n}.
This follows by realizing that if t
€
T(a) then a = (a , . .
.
,a ;
a.,...,a ; . . . ;a 1 ,— ,a.) , 1 £ i £ t so that t € T(aa. ..
)
1 t 1 l l+l
if i < t and t
€
T(aa ) if i = t. Conversely, if t G T(aa )
and t < n then t
€
T(a) and clearly t £ T(aa) for a ^ a
-_i_-|*
Finally, n 6 T(aa) if and only if a ^ a.. .
Let now a = (a, , . . . ,a ) and assume n > 2 since the
1 n
lemma is trivial for n = 1,2. If T(a) = then by (3) T(aO)
U T(al) = {n} so that A (act) ^ n for any a £ A.
If T(a) i then there is b = ($ ,...,6,) and





a = (be be ... be b) and T(bc) = 0.
m times




If T(b) ^ then there is e = (e ,...,£ ) and d = (&,...,& )
such that
b = (ed ed ... ed e) and T(ed) = 0.
Hence taking a ^ e = 3 we have
A (act) ^ m(k+£) +r + s^k+£ + 2 = n-k+2
and since 2k ^ n - 1 we obtain
A(aa) :>
-^ + 2 > + 1. The lemma is proved,
3. ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH RANDOM PERIOD.
In this section we consider the case where
(1) the period t of Emitter's sequence is chosen randomly
according to some distribution v known to both players,
(2) Predictor is allowed to observe the first n digits of
the Emitter's sequence and tries to predict the next
(n+l)st digit,
(3) the payoff to Emitter is zero if the prediction is correct
and one otherwise.
In other words, the expected payoff is the probability of
wrong prediction, which the Emitter is trying to maximize and the
Predictor to minimize.
We will denote the resulting zero-sum game by G(v,n),
where v(t), t = 1,2,... is the period distribution,
v(t) * 0, t = 1,2,... ; I v(t) = 1
t=l
and n = 1,2,... is the length of the sequence observed by the
Predictor.
Next we describe Emitter's and Predictor's pure strategies.
To specify a pure strategy Emitter must choose for every
t = 1,2,... a binary sequence with the period t. Emitter's pure
strategies s are therefore sequences
s = {s
,
t = 1,2,...}, where s € B •
The set S of all Emitter's pure strategies is then an infinite
Cartesian product S = 0, x Q, x . . . of finite sets and is
therefore uncountable.
Predictor's pure strategies <j> are simpler to describe.
Each <}> is a mapping of A into A = {0,1}. Fo^r each a € A
,
(})(a) is the prediction of the (n+l)st term of the Emitter's
sequence if the first n terms observed are the n-tuple a. The
set $ of all Predictor's pure strategies is therefore a finite
2
n
set of 2 elements.
The payoff function W(s,<J>) is then t,iven by
W(s,4>) = I v(t) W (s,<|>) ; s € S, <j> (E $
t=l










o if (Kd 11 ) - «•>.,.n+l
It is easy to see that W (s,(j)) is nothing but conditional proba-
bility of wrong pr diction given that the period is t and hence
W(s,<(>) is the unconditional error probability.
The game G(v,n) is now formally defined by the triplet
(S,$,W). This is an infinite zero-sum game, however, since the set
$ is finite and the ^ayoff function is nonnegative and bounded by
one we have by the well-known theorem of Wald [8] the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.1 : The game G(v,n) has a value and Predictor has
an optimal strategy.
Let us turn our attention to the existence of Emitter's
optimal strategy. By another Wald's theorem ([8], Theorem 2.20)
an optimal strategy exists if the corresponding space of pure strate-
gies is totally bounded with respect to the intrinsic metric
([8], sec. 2.1). Now the space S of Emitter's pure strategies
is totally bounded in the above sense if for every e > there
exists a finite subset S of S such that for every s 6 S
e
there is an r £ S for which
max|w(s,<f>) - W(r,<f))| < e.
It is easy to see that this condition is satisfied for the game
G(v,n); take an integer T such that ) v(t) < e and define
t>T




with s fixed for t > T. Thus we have proved the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2 : In the game G(v,n) Emitter has also an optimal
strategy.
In general, optimal strategies will be mixed strategies,
that is probability distributions on the corresponding spaces of
pure strategies.
Let X be the space of Emitter's mixed strategies. Since








where x is a probability distribution on the finite set Q .
In other words, x 6 X is completely specified by a sequence of
probability distributions x ; t = 1,2,... . The payoff function
W then extends onto X x $ by
W(x,<j>) =
t °°
W(s,<|>)dx(s) I v(t)W i_(s,(}))dx(s)
t=l
s






Predictor's mixed strategies y € Y are again probability
distributions on the finite set $. Thus for every such y and
s 6 S we can define
W(s,y) = I W(s,<j>)y(<j>) = £ »(t) J W (s,<f>)y (cf>)
.
<J>€* t=l <(>€$
Let y € Y and let for every a 6 A , a 6(0,1} f (a) = ), y(<t>)
{<|>:<f>(a)=a}
Clearly, f (a) is the probability of predicting a if the
n-tuple a has been observed and if Predictor uses the mixed
strategy y. Thus f = (f ,f ) could be called Predictor's










v f (w ) if co = .
1 — ' n+1
Conversely, if f = (f_,f ) where f maps A into [0,1] and
f (a) + f (a) = 1 for all a 6 A
n
then
y(<|>) = I f Q





{a€An :<j>(a)=0} {a€An :<}> (a)=l)
is a mixed strategy and (4) holds. Hence we can work with the set
F of Predictor's behavioral strategies instead of with the set Y,
Proposition 3.3 : The value v of G(v,n) is given by
v = min I v(t) max max{I (a0)f , (a) ,1 (al)f (a)} (5)
f€F t=l a£A
n t 1 t U
and f is Predictor's optimal strategy if and only if it minimizes
the series above.
Proof: Since G(v,n) has a value we must have v = min sup W(s,f)
f€F s6S
Now












where the latter maximum is taken over the set of all (n+1) -tuples
aa ^ A for which wj = aa for some co £ ft , i.e. for
which I (aa) = 1. Hence
t
v






n t 1 t U
and the second assertion follows from the existence of Predictor's
optimal strategy.
Setting f (a) = C^"*"^) for each a 6 A in (5) we obtain
Corollary : ^ v ^ —
Proposition 3.4 ; There exists Predictor's optimal strategy f
n * *
such that for each a £ A either f (a) = (1,0) or f (a) = (0,1)
* 11
or f (a) = (~2 ,2") •
Proof : Let for every t = l,...,n+2 and a 6 A













where _f_ denotes the vector with 2 components f
n
(a). Clearly,
B(t,a) is a convex polyhedron contained in the 2 -dimensional
unit hypercube. Furthermore, the vertices of B(t,a) are vectors
with components or 1 or 1/2 only.











= n B(t,a )
t=l
is attained at one of the vertices of B . Denoting f_ the
u —0
vertex at which the minimum is attained we see that for each a 6 A
fJJ(a) = or 1/2 or 1. (6)
Finally, since I (aa) = 1 for t > n + 1






min / xi\ min L (|«) = min / ,^ L CL".)
u€A
n(n+2) u -0 ^(n+2) u -0
—0 u
= L . (f__ ), where u* minimizes L (f^,)
u* —(J u —
U
u* U"* u**





optimal strategy which together with (6) terminates the proof.
Proposition 3.5 : Let £ v(t) > — . Then v = — and
11 n t>n+1f(a) = (y,-^-) , a € A is the unique Predictor's optimal strategy,
Proof : Let f be an optimal strategy and assume that for some
a 6 A , a € {0,1} f (a) i — . It follows from the proof of
(X Cm
14
Proposition 3.4 that there must be another optimal strategy with
* *






I v(t) maxn max{I (a0)f (a) ,1 (al)f (a)
}
t=l a£A
* * v 1
^ max max{f
n
(a) ,f. (a)} > v(t) >—
a£A t>n+l
1 * 1
so that v > — , which is a contradiction. Hence f (a) = — for





{0,1}. For this f
v = I v (t) T maxn max{I (aO),I (al)} = j
t=l a€A
since for every t = 1,2,... there exists a 6 A and a £ {0,1}
such that I (a ) =1.
Proposition 3.6 ; Let the distribution v be such that
v([f] + 1) > I v(t), (7)
t>[fl+l
where [— ] is the integral part of — . Then
v = I v(t) (8)
t>[f]+l
15
and the Predictor s behavioral strategy f defined by
A(aa) s: [fI + 1 => f*(a) = (9)
is an optimal strategy.
Proof: Let us assume first that n is odd so that [— ] + 1 = ——
,
Let e £ A be the n-tuple which has 1 at the ( ) th place
and zeros elsewhere. Clearly
I (eO) =1 if an only if t > —r—
,
and
I (el) =1 if and only if either t = —r— or t > n + 1,
Hence
I v(t) max max{I («0)f.(a),I (al)f_ (a)}
4- 1 ^A 11 t 1 t Ut=l a£A
^ I v(t) max{I (eO)f (e),I (el)f (e)}
t=l
-n+1
= Vp~) f Q (e) + f 1 (e) I v(t) + max{f 1 (e),f (e)} £ v(t)
n+1 ._ t>n+l
: t£n+l
^ I v(t) by the hypothesis. Thus v ^ £ v(t).
n+1 n+1t>— t»r
*
Next let f be the strategy (9). Then by Lemma 2.1
16










Hence v = £ v(t) and f is an optimal strategy.
n+1
If n is even we begin with e having 1 at the (yt-l)st place,
The rest follows verbatim.
If the hypothesis of the above proposition is not satisfied
the game G(v,n) is very difficult to solve. As seen from Propo-
sition 3.3, this amounts to solving the nonlinear programming
problem:






It is true that it can be solved by breaking it into a number of linear
programming problems as we did in the proof of Proposition 3.4 but
the size of this task is still formidable. A slight simplification,
however, can be obtained by considering truncated versions of
G(v,n) .
17
Let T = 1,2,..., let G (v,n) be the game (S,$,WT )
obtained from G(v,n) by truncating the distribution v at T,
that is setting v(t) = for t > T and normalizing to one.
T T T
Proposition 3.7 : Let v
,
f and x be the value and optimal
strategies respectively of the truncated game G (v,n). Then, as
T * °°,
v * v, f -* f and x -> x
,
where v, f and x are the value and optimal strategies of
G(v,n).
Proof : Since v is a probability distribution and
|wT (x,f) - W(x,f)| <; I v(t)
t>T
T
W (x,f) converges to W(x,f) uniformly in both f and x, which
implies the statement.
To the end of this section we present a solution of a small game
G(v,n).
Example : Let n = 5, v(t) > for t = 1,...,5 and v(t) =
for t > 5. To compute the right-hand side of (5) we need the
values of I (aa) for t = 1,...,5, a € A , a = 0,1. These























) .fgU^) >f (a15 } }















+ v(5)max{f (ai ): i = 17,..., 31}. (11)
Looking at the expression (11) as a function of 64 nonnegative
variables f.(a.) constrained to satisfy f_(a.) + f n (a.) = 1 we
j x J i 1 l
see that the only variables that make the minimization difficult
are those for which both f_(a.) and f..(a.) appear in (11).
Hence it is easy to conclude that the minimum of (11) , the value









} + v(4)max{ 1-^,1-^,1^} (12)
over all u
1
,u ,u„ satisfying £ u. £ 1, j = 1,2,3.
The minimum of (12) is found to be the smallest of the four numbers:
v(4)+v(5), v(3)+v(5), v(2) + v(3) + v(4), -|(v(2)+v(3)+v(4)+v(5)
)
Hence, the value v of the game is:
Case 1 : v(4) £ v(3) and v(4) + v(5) £ v(2) + v(3)
v = v(4) + v(5)
19
Case 2 : v(3) £ v(4) and v(3) + v(5) <: v(2) + v(4)
v = v(3) + v(5)
Case 3 : v(2) + v(3) + v(4) <£ v(5)
v = v(2) + v(3) + v(4)
Case 4 : v(2) + v(3) - v(5) £ v(4) £ v(3) + v(5) - v(2)
v = |(v(2)+v(3)+v(4)+v(5)) = |(l-v(l))
Predictor's optimal strategies for each of the four cases are given
in Table 1.
20
4. ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH PENALTY FOR LONG PERIODS.
We will now relax the restrictions on Emitter and let him
choose freely the period of the sequence emitted. We will, however
impose a penalty on Emitter for choosing too large periods. The
game then proceeds as follows:
(1) Emitter chooses a period t = 1,2,... and a periodic
binary sequence with the period t.
(2) Predictor is allowed to observe the first n digits of that
sequence and tries to predict the next (n+l)st digit.
(3) The payoff to Emitter is zero if the prediction is correct
and is equal to a nonnegative constant c(t) if the predic-
tion is wrong and the emitted sequence has period t.
The sequence c(t), t = 1,2,... represents the penalty and we
assume that for all t = 1,2,...
c(t) ^ c(t+l) :> (13)
To avoid the trivial case we assume that c(t) > for at least
one t
.
The resulting zero-sum game is then specified by the
sequence (13) and an integer n = 1,2,... . We will denote it by
G(c(t),n).
The space S of Emitter's pure strategies s now consists
of ordered pairs
s = (t,s ) where t = 1,2,... and s (Eft.
Hence S is countably infinite.
21
The space $ of Predictor's pure strategies as same as
same as before.
The payoff function W(s,cj)), s £ S,
<J>
6 $ is for
s = (t,s
t
), s = 0) given by
c(t) if Hu\ n ) * Vr
W(s,4») = \ (14)
if d>(«l ) = a) , - .
— n+1

















Since the space $ is finite and by (13) the payoff function is
bounded we have
Proposition 4.1 ; The game G(c(t),n) has a value and Predictor
has an optimal strategy.
This time, however, we can obtain explicit expressions.
Proposition 4.2 : The value v of G(c(t),n) is given by
„ - m3Y c(X(aO))c(X(al)) ( .
n c(X(aO)) + c(A(al))
* n




c(A(aO) - c(A(al)) (16)
is Predictor's optimal strategy
Remark : Expressions — are to be interpreted as in (15) and










(a) sup c(t)I (al),f
1






From (13) for a = 0,1









h(a) = min max f (a)c(A(aa)) .
f(a) a-0,1 a
(17)
However, h(a) is easily recognized to be the value of the two-




so that (15) and (16) hold and the proposition is proved
23
Let us now turn our attention to Emitter's strategies. Since
the space S is countable, the space X of Emitter's mixed strat-
egies is simply the set of all probability distributions on S.





where E, = £ , £ „,... is a probability distribution on positive
integers and y are distributions on finite sets Q . Clearly,
if s = (t,s ) £ S and x € X then x(s) = £ y (s )
.
* * * n
Proposition 4.3: Let a = (a,,...,a ) ( A be such that
1 n





where h is defined by (17), let for a = 0,1














if t = t,
,-1
c(t )[ c ( t() ) + C (t
1












is an optimal strategy.
Proof : Notice first that since by Lemma 2.1
max{A(aO) ,X(al)} > + 1
the (n+l)st digits of the two sequences u) = r and w' = r
t t
l
must be different. Let now <j> £ $ . We have







= v,+ E cCt^UCa ) - a)' | £ min E c(t ) = , " , \„ ,C
l
X n+1
a-0,1 "a a C(t } + C(V
and since this is true for any <{>€$, x is an optimal strategy,
Remark : The results of this section remain true even if the time
when Predictor is required to make a prediction is allowed to
depend on the observed sequence in some predetermined fashion.
For instance, we may ask Predictor to predict the next digit as
soon as he observes a certain number k of ones or as soon as
the number of observed digits reaches some n, whichever occurs
first.
25
The space $ of Predictor's pure strategies is then the
set of all mappings <$> from a finite set B into {0,1}, where
the set B is a finite collection of finite strings of zeros and
ones with the property that for every binary sequence to £ ft
there is a string b
€
B, which is the initial segment of w
.
The set B is determined by the requirement imposed upon
the prediction time. For instance, in the case mentioned above
the set B will consist of all strings of at most n zeros and ones
which contain at most k zeros.
The only modification needed in order to extend the results
of this section to this more general case is to replace the set
A by the set B.




(6-t) if t = 1,...,6,
if t > 6.
To solve the game we first compute A (a. a) for each a. £ A ,
a = 0,1. These are in the first two columns of Table 2. Then
compute c(A(a.a)) for (19) and h(a.) from (17) - see Table 2.
Hence the value v of the game G(c(t),n) is v = 1.5
and Predictor's optimal strategy f as computed from (16) is in
the last column of Table 2. Emitter's optimal strategies are com-
puted from Proposition 4.3. We obtain
26
and
y^CUOllAciOO) 00 }) = 1, y^CUOllOlAciOOlO) 00 }) = 1
and arbitrary otherwise. In other words, Emitter should produce
the sequence 011011011... or 110110110... with probability




In the previous two sections we dealt exclusively with
zero-sum games. That is, the payoff to Predictor was always
assumed to be the negative amount of the payoff to Emitter.
Let us now modify the game G(c(t),n) of the previous
section by adding to its description the assumption:
(4) The payoff to Predictor is one if his prediction is a correct
one and zero otherwise.






where the strategy spaces S,$ and Emitter's payoff function W
are same as in the zero-sum game (G(c(t),n). The Predictor's
payoff function W is defined by








where oo is the sequence s .
Proposition 5.1 : The nonzero-sum game G'(c(t),n) has an equili-
brium point (x ,f ), where f is defined by (16) and x xs
defined as in Proposition 4.3 with the exception that £ = £ = 1/2,
C
1
Furthermore, all equilibrium points are equivalent and interchangeable
28
yielding the minimax payoffs v and 1/2 to Emitter and Predictor
respectively.
Proof : Let a be defined by (18) . Then for all f 6 F by the
definition of x
~V & 4c dfc db 1VX « f) =C t £ (a ) + \f l (a > "I-
so that trivially
sup W (x*,f) = W (x*,f*) = \.
f€F




for any s £ S
.




)5* f*(a*) + cCt^K* f^Ca")
= c(t )c(t
1
)[c(t ) + c(t
1
)]"1 = h(a*) = v.
Hence
sup W (s,f ) = W (x ,f ) = v,
s€S
which together with (20) proves that (x ,f ) is an equilibrium
point yielding minimax payoffs.
29
Finally it is easy to see that no equilibrium point can
yield payoff greater than minimax for either of the players since
this would decrease the other player's payoff below his minimax
value. Interchangebility is obvious.
The last type of an Emission-Prediction game considered in
this paper is the most general one and is obtained by further
relaxing the restrictions on Predictor.
(1) Emitter chooses a period t = 1,2,... and a periodic
binary sequence with this period.
(2) Predictor is allowed to observe as many digits of the
sequence as he wishes and after he decides to cease
observation he is required to predict the next digit.
(3) The payoff to Emitter is zero if the prediction is
correct and is equal to c (t) ^ if the prediction
is wrong and the sequence has period t.
(4) The payoff to Predictor is zero if his prediction is
wrong and is equal to c (n) ^ if it is correct
and the length of the observed segment was n.
The constants c (t) and c (n) represent penalties for long
periods and lengthy observation. We assume that
t = 1,2,... =* 1 - c (1) ;> c (t) :> c
1
(t+l), lim c^t) =
and
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The space S of Emitter's pure strategies in this game is
same as before. Predictor's pure strategies \\i £ V are pairs
ty
= (B,*),
where B is a finite set of finite strings of zeros and ones
such that for every to 6 ft there is some b 6 B which is an
initial segment of to.
<f>
is a mapping from B into {0,1}.
Clearly, the set ¥ of all Predictor's pure strategies is now
countably infinite.
Let s = (t,s ), i|> = (B,(j)), co = s , b 6 B be the
initial segment of to, and let n be the length of b. The







c (t) if <t>(b) t oo
n+1 ,




(n) if <j)(b) = co
n+1 ,




Proposition 5.2 : The game G(c
1
(t) ,c (n) ) has an equilibrium
point
.
Proof : Let for j = 1,2
p. (s,s') = sup|W. (s,i|>) - W.(s',i|;)| and
J' 1 ^ J J
p TC*-»*
r























where |b| is the length of the longest string b 6 B. Since
lim c. (t) = lim c„(n) = the finite sets S and i|> are12 e e
e-nets in the (pseudo) metric spaces (S,p ) and (^>P 99 )
respectively and hence these spaces are totally bounded ("condi-
tionally compact" in Wald's terminology). By [8], Theorem 2.1,
so are then the spaces (S,p
_) and (^,p 91 ). Let, for k = 1,2,...,
(x ,y ) be an equilibrium point in the finite game (S , ,^ , ,W ,W )
Then there is a subsequence (x ,y ) , i = 1,2,..., and a pair
* *
x x
of mixed strategies x 6 X, y € Y such that as i -> °°, j = 1,2,
•k k k *
p. (x ,x ) * and p. _ (y ,y ) -> 0. In particular this
J »1 k. J >^ ^j






k »yk } " Vx*>y*)l + o, (2i)
i i
|





) - sup W
1





,y, ) is an equilibrium point in G,
k.. k. k.ii i
sup w
1





n n i i i1/k.
whence letting i > °° in (21) through (23) we obtain
sup W (x,y ) = W (x ,y ).
x&
Similarly,
sup W (x ,y) = W (x ,y ) ,
y€Y
so that (x ,y ) is an equilibrium point in G(c. (t) ,c ? (n) ) and
the proposition is proved.
Remark : We suspect that much stronger statements, namely that
all equilibrium points are equivalent and interchangeable, can











f (a) = (f*(a),f*(a))
t t
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 412 3 4 5 12 3 4 5
1 1
*) *\ \ \
2 1 1 I \
3 10 1 1 > (1,0) / \ (1,0)
4 11 1 J I J
5 10 1 1 1 (0,1) > (i»o)
6 10 1 1
) }
7 110 1 1 ) (1,0) I d,o)
8 111 1 J J yi,o) > n
9 10 1 1 arbitrary (0,1)
1
10 10 1 1 1 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
11 10 10 1 1 (0,1) (0,1) 1 1 (--)
12 10 11 1 (1,0) (1,0) 1 (1,0)
13 110 1 1 arbitrary (0,1) 1 (1A)
14 110 1 1 1 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
15 1110 1 1 arbitrary (0,1)
J16 1111 1 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
17 10 1 (0,1) (0,1)
\
(0,1)
18 10 1 1 1 arbitrary (1,0) (--)
19 10 10 1 1 (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
20 10 11 1 1 arbitrary (1,0)
j
4'2 ;




22 10 10 1 1 1 (1,0) (1,0) / (--)
23 10 110 1 1 (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
1 T




A / (0,1) \26 110 1 1 1 > (0,1) 1 > (0 ' 1}
27 110 10 1 )
(
j










> (0,1) > (0,1)
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